and Chen pointed out that Das et al. scheme fail to protect the user anonymity, and proposed a new scheme. And then in 2007, Hu et al. pointed out that Chien and Chen scheme also has some problems; it is Strong masquerading server/user attack, Restricted replay attack, Denial of service attack. it also slow wrong password detection, and proposed a new scheme. In 2008, Bindu et al. repeatedly pointed out on Chien and Chen scheme and proposed their scheme. However, we point out that all of their scheme also has some problems; it is not to protect the user anonymity and Denial of service attack. In addition, Bindu et al. is vulnerable to Strong masquerading server/user attack. Therefore, we demonstrate that their scheme also have some problems; it is the user anonymity and denial of service attack as above. 
Introduction
In 2004, Das et al. [1] proposed a remote authentication scheme to authenticate users while preserving the user anonymity. Their scheme adopted dynamic identification to achieve this function. Several schemes and improvements for remote user authentication schemes using smart cards [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] have been proposed. Then in 2005, Chien and Chen [8] pointed out Das et al. scheme fails to protect the user anonymity and proposed a new remote authentication scheme preserving user anonymity.
In 2007, however, Hu et al. [9] pointed out that Chien and Chen scheme also has some problems; it cannot resist strong masquerading server/user attack, insider attack, denial of service attack and restricted replay attack; it also has the problem of slow wrong password detection. In 2008, Bindu et. al. [10] repeatedly pointed out that Chien and Chen scheme has problems. Therefore they proposed their scheme respectively. [4] . This scheme is composed of 3 phases namely the registration phase, the login phase and authentication phase. These phases are described in Fig. 1 as follows : The notations used throughout this paper are as follows:
[ This phase is invoked whenever U initially registers or re-registers to S .
Step R1 : U ⇒ S : ID , h( t ⊕ PW ) .
Step R2 :
Step R3 : S ⇒ U : a smart card containing ID, m, I, M and the public para-
Step R5 : U enters t into his/her smart card.
[Login phase]
This phase is invoked whenever U wants to login S .
Step L1 : After checking the validity of the ID and verifying M ⊕ h( t ⊕ PW ) equals the stored m , the smart card generates a random number r u = g a mod p , then computes R = h ( I ⊕ r u ) and
Step L2 :
This phase is invoked whenever S receives U ' s login request.
Step A1 :
Step A2 : After checking the validity of the ID, S compares the decrypted data N u with the corresponding N s .
Step A3 : S computes I = h ( ID ⊕ x) and verifies whether the following equation holds:
Step A4 :
where r s = g b mod p .
Step A5 : U checks whether decrypted data contains the value 
Bindu et al. Scheme
The scheme is divided into three phases: the registration phase, the login phase and authentication.
[Registration phase]
Step R1 :
Step R2 : S => U : the smart card containing m, I
and the public parameters ( h ( ), p) .
[Login phase]
Step L1 : Generate a random number r u = g a mod p .
Step L3 : Compute C = M ⊕ r u .
Step L4 : Compute
Step L5 : U -> S :
[Authentication phase]
Step A2 :
Step A3 : S -> U :
Step A4 : U checks whether the decrypted data contains r u + 1 . And then U computes Step A5 :
Step A6 : S checks whether it is equal to r s +1 or not.
Analysis of the Hu et al. and the Bindu et al. Scheme
In this section, we explained attack method at Hu et al.
and Bindu et al.
Hu et al. scheme
Hu et al. scheme has some problems; it is user anonymity and DoS attack. We explained these attack at Hu et al. scheme with figure 3. Step 1 : The attacker computes R E = h ( I E ⊕ r E )
User Anonymity
and
card by oneself.
Step 2 : The attacker obtains h(x) as h(x) =
Step 3 : The attacker can compute the secret key R i of a user as R i = C i ⊕h(x) , after intercepting and blocking the message of the user in Step L3 to the server.
[ Fig. 5 ] User anonymity at Bindu et. al
[ Fig. 6 ] DoS attack at Bindu et. al.
The attacker can acquire the user's ID . And he/she can know and guess the own user of the ID .
Denial of service attack
We mentioned that these scheme inform anyone the correct value of secret key R . We show that this scheme is vulnerable on DoS attack as Fig. 4 . And then the attacker can compute as follow.
Step 1 : The attacker intercepts and blocks the login request message of the user
Step 2 : The attacker decrypts the message E R [ r u , ID, N u ] and changes N u ' .
Step 3 : The attacker encrypts the message
Step 4 : The server sends a synchronization signal to the user. Note that the user must sends N u with N s .
The attacker forges N u to the server. Therefore, the server cannot but reject the message.
Bindu et al. scheme
Bindu et al. scheme also has some problems; it is user anonymity and DoS attack. We explained these attack at Bindu et al. scheme with figure.
User Anonymity
Similarly, Bindu et al. also drop the user's ID to anyone as Fig. 5 . Note that the smart card of the attacker contains m, I and the public parameters ( h ( ), p ) .
Step 1 : The attacker computes
from his/her smart card by oneself.
Step 2 : The attacker obtains h( x) ⊕ x as
Step 3 : The attacker can compute the secret key R i of a user as
after intercepting and blocking the message of the user in Step L3 to the server.
Denial of service attack
As the same, Note that Bindu et al. scheme also inform anyone the correct value of the secret key R. And then, the attacker can perform as follow in Fig. 6 .
Step 2 : The attacker decrypts the message E R [ r u , ID, T ] and changes T E .
The server checks the validity of T E and reject the login message of the user.
Conclusion
All of the schemes that have been proposed up to the present fail to completely conquer the problems as above, although communication used smart card is increasing on network. In order to be secure by network, we need the scheme that can conquer these mentioned problems for efficient authentication and smoothly preserving the service to the user. To archive the scheme, we need a secret key that can be known only to the user and the server by public key but the attacker, with considering on public key and secret key. In order to use protocols using smart cards, the protocols have to provide user anonymity and overcome DDoS attack, because of user information is considered as privacy, therefore user anonymity attack threats privacy of users and DDoS attack can kill server providing service. 
